“Believe those who are seeking the truth; doubt those who find it.”
-André Gide
There are many questions to ponder in analyzing Donald Trump’s victory and what Kamala Harris’s loss means for the Democrats. In the context of a broad triumph of the right, what’s left?
Before anyone has had time to fully digest this decisive but unprecedented political comeback, the answers are coming fast. The Democratic Party is too conservative. Or it’s too liberal. Kamala was a lackluster candidate. Or she just didn’t do enough podcasts. It’s because incumbent parties are doing badly in many democracies. Except where they’re not (like Mexico).
I’m reminded of a similar moment in June, just after Claudia Sheinbaum and Morena swept the Mexican elections (but coming from the left, not the right). A key difference of course is that Sheinbaum consistently led in the polls, and was representing a popular incumbent party. However, many in the “comentocracia” were still taken aback by the magnitude of the Morena win.
The media, the academics, the former presidents, the lawyers were all confused. How could voters choose to undermine democracy rather than uphold it? How could they vote against checks and balances? How could this “regressive” movement be so popular?
The answers often blamed the voters themselves—for their ignorance, credulity or natural authoritarian instincts. That they were “bought” with social programs. A few did pause to consider whether the alternative, the main opposition coalition and their candidate, could be to blame. Or whether perhaps Mexicans feel they have been badly served by previous governments, and their institutions, despite the existence of checks and balances.
Mexico does not have a two-party system, so the electoral polarization isn’t as binary as in the U.S. (Xóchitl Gálvez won 27.45% of the vote, and the third candidate, Jorge Álvarez Máynez won 10.32% to Sheinbaum’s 59.76%). But it may be beginning to show the contours of one. So far, Morena and its allies have the clearest message, and have the nearly hegemonic results to show for it. How the remaining opposition parties (PAN, PRI, Movimiento Ciudadano) can reorganize into an electoral foe (or foes) to be reckoned with is still an open question. Perhaps the U.S. will move in the other direction, with a new party (or parties) emerging as a result of this political realignment.
I started working on an essay about how AMLO and his movement have colored my view of politics long before Trump—that unlikely and unapologetic hustler, who “swallows criticisms like vitamins” in the words of Juan Villoro—stood on a stage in Palm Beach to declare victory and a new “golden age” for the United States, filling many with dread.
As a committed skeptic, I try to stay equidistant between cynicism and belief. And by closely observing Mexican politics in the age of AMLO, I have felt better prepared for what’s happened up north.
Some of the lessons I’ve learned made me uncomfortably question previous assumptions and beliefs. But I think of them as a framework for parsing this new political era—a tool to better see what is there, rather than what we wish to see, as we near the quarter-century mark.
5 lessons I’ve learned from AMLO
Andrés Manuel López Obrador is the most influential politician in Mexico’s recent history, and as the founder of the political movement that today rules most of the country, his legacy will shape its future for decades to come.
AMLO’s politics have often defied categorization. His nationalist/populist agenda of the “old” left has made him enemies on both the Mexican right and the “new” global left. He’s been compared to Trump, and to Hugo Chávez. He’s a leftist who promotes austerity, the use of the military and bolstering national petroleum production; a polarizing populist who was also consistently popular.
AMLO is a category unto himself, but his politics are not new. Indeed, he was often accused of being an out-of-touch throwback, particularly when it came to energy and foreign policy. But his popularity speaks to a political intution that sliced across the conventional left-right spectrum and is worth studying as we move into a new era in global politics.
I’ve tried to encapusulate my understanding of this leader and his movement as a political force in five broad takeaways.
Class matters
AMLO’s leftist populism is firmly rooted in class as the key identifier and the guiding narrative of his policies. “For the good of all, the poor first,” was one of his oft-repeated slogans, which Claudia Sheinbaum also upholds as a fundamental part of the 4T’s patent-pending philosophy of “Mexican humanism.”
AMLO was known for his jabs at the elite class (“fifís,” “conservatives,” “neoliberals”) and defense of “the people” in his rambling mañaneras. While the war on classism was often paired rhetorically in AMLO’s speeches with confronting racism and sexism (and which he often conflated), his harshest criticism was reserved for the country’s socioeconomic elites, including the majority of the media. He has expertly exploited the deep, historic inequality of Mexican society—along the fault lines of class—to advance his political project.
In policy terms, there were important labor law changes (raising the minimum wage by 182%, for example) made during AMLO’s term, which look set to continue with Sheinbaum. The continued increase in the minimum wage as well as Morena’s social welfare programs have now been enshrined in the Constitution.
As AMLO put it in his sixth and final report to the nation in September:
“It's a badge of pride to have been able to show that change is possible with the support of the people, even when faced with opposition from oligarchic powers and media outlets or manipulation tools that in the past imposed ways of thinking and acting for their own benefit.”
Politics is an art, not a science
AMLO has been described as a “pure political animal” and indeed, was a key player in the national political scene for nearly two decades. What makes AMLO—who lacks certain conventional qualities, such as crisp eloquence and a sober demeanor—a durable political presence? He understands the potency of symbolism, of charisma and to paraphrase Nadia Bolz-Weber, of saying what sounds honest, even if it’s not true.
Living in an age of trust scarcity, it seems we are more bewildered than ever by politicians like AMLO who are generally viewed by voters as trustworthy and authentic, even while they relentlessly fail the fact-checkers’ assessments. AMLO’s mañaneras were known for his infamous “otros datos” and often contained more hyperbole than cold, hard data. But trust is hard to measure, and its significance is hard to underestimate. Maybe people prefer the truth be stretched than hidden?
Shifts in the national zeitgeist can be difficult to predict, and skilled politicians capitalize on them much like an actor can sense and respond to a live audience, while others (even if better qualified) fail to read the room. The election of AMLO in 2018 felt like the triumph of a rare sentiment in Mexico’s political history: hope.
Mexico was on the rebound from a deeply unpopular president (Enrique Peña Nieto left office with about a 20% approval rating) and the disillusionment brought many into the fold of AMLO’s “regeneration” movement. While AMLO’s term failed to deliver on the promise of erradicating corruption, the public perception of the prevalence of corruption has moderately improved since 2017. When AMLO took office in 2018, a Gallup poll showed 29% of Mexicans were confident in their national government. When he left office, that percentage had risen to 61%.
The “end of history” is…history
Francis Fukuyama’s book heralding the “end of history” in 1992 has long been a lightning rod for discussion about the post-Cold War world order. Fukuyama saw the triumph of liberal democracy paired with free market economics as inevitable, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, which would mean the end of ideologically-driven wars and the decline of nationalism. This ahistorical utopian vision, which Fukuyama himself since revised in two other books, seems almost quaint today.
As one contemporary critic, Paul Hirst, pointed out, Fukuyama’s thesis failed to account for the inherent flaws in democracies, and the deepening inequalities that are engendered by capitalism. In simple terms, what about the “losers” in this new age of globalization?
Hirst highlights the growth of movements within democracies seeking greater accountability in government and suspicious of oligarchical trends:
“Many of these movements for political reform are radical, but they are not authoritarian. They aim at the diffusion and decentralisation of power and influence. They are dissatisfied with the outcomes of the unhealthily close link between big government and big business. Radicalism cannot now be so easily contained by the fear of Communism. The future of liberal democracy is likely to be one of conflict and change, not complacent celebration.”
AMLO’s view of recent history is shaped by his rejection of neoliberalism—the globalist expansion of the free market and privatization—and a return to a nationalistic, “sovereign” and inward-looking agenda. He villified the “mafia of power” that he saw as the shadowy collusion between economic interests and political power. He also was notoriously nonchalant about global diplomacy, claiming “the best foreign policy is good domestic policy.”
The pundit class in Mexico often sounds ready to give up on this backwards country and move to New York or Switzerland (well, a lot of them have actually). There is a current of disdain for Mexico and Mexicans that is hard to hide; they seem to see the country through the eyes of more sophisticated, finger-wagging outsiders. This is part of why they found AMLO’s nationalism and lack of interest in global events so ridiculous, and an easy mark.
On the other side, the “chairos” (AMLO’s intellectual supporters) would say that this is yet another example of Mexican elites pinning their hopes on a foreign power (or foreign ideas) fixing the mess the rest of the country has made of things.
While patriotism and nationalism lack nuance, and can lead to short-sighted policymaking, AMLO’s popularity may have something to do with the fact that he takes pride in being Mexican, and in the nation’s culture and potential—seeing the country through Mexican eyes.
Austerity can come from the left
AMLO’s policy of “republican austerity” has meant cutting the budgets of government agencies, in service of the maxim that “you can’t have a rich government with a poor people.” Reducing government spending and promising not to raise taxes doesn’t match up with the field guide description of a leftist, and some have used it to conclude that AMLO is actually a conservative wolf in socialist sheep’s clothing.
But this somewhat U.S.-centric view assumes that leftist politicians necessarily increase both taxes and government expenditure, when it is often more qualitative than quantitative change. In the case of AMLO’s government, he has increased significantly the amount the government spends on social programs, public infrastructure projects (like the Tren Maya and the Olmeca refinery) and national defense, and cut budgets for other departments (including the departments of health, culture and the interior). The total net federal budget increased 20.5% between 2018 and 2024. It is worth noting that federal tax revenue increased 48% in nominal terms between 2018 and 2023, via improved collection mechanisms and enforcement of exisiting tax regulation.
AMLO tied this idea of austerity into the crusade against corruption, and chose powerful symbols of his predecessors’ lavish spending such as the US $200 million presidential plane—which he finally sold to Tajikistan in 2023—to demonstrate how his movement was transforming the country’s government. He and Sheinbaum have both made it a point to take commercial flights.
No golden escalators or sneakers for the 4T.
Hatred is blind
This is the most important lesson of all. My curiosity about AMLO and his followers—as an outsider—was never blinded by hatred, by reflexive dismissal. This is how I came to better understand what he represents; the good and the bad, neither messiah nor apocalypse.
If we assume bad intent on the part of millions of voters we disagree with, we lose the ability see the world from their perspective. And we do so at our peril.
Thank you for reading and feel free to send me your suggestions, comments and questions at hola@themexpatriate.com. If you would like to support my work, please consider signing up for a paid subscription below.
Wow so much to digest here.
These were the key take aways for me from your article:
1. Class Focus: AMLO’s politics emphasize class inequality with policies like social programs and minimum wage increases.
2. Symbolic Politics: AMLO uses charisma and trust over strict adherence to facts, resonating deeply with voters.
3. Rejection of Neoliberalism: He prioritizes nationalism and sovereignty over globalist policies.
4. Austerity from the Left: AMLO cuts government excess but increases spending on infrastructure and social welfare.
5. Avoid Hatred: Understanding voter perspectives, not dismissing them, is crucial for meaningful political engagement.
I think your analysis helps explain why AMLO has been compared to MAGA and why both AMLO and MAGA have been successful in what is arguably the state of the post neoliberal era and “post-truth/trust” media landscape.
In this environment. The left in the USA is struggling to perform all 5 points above, the establishment can’t agree on fully committing to them, much less to what degree. This speaks I think to the fissures within the establishment parties. Much how the political and economic consensus between the left and right has been broken, the consensus within the parties have been too. I don’t think this tension simply comes down to Progressive vs Liberal tension, there is something new emerging that in some ways is orthogonal to the traditional divisions on the left.
Anyhow, the right under MAGA embraced these points you bring up, some like #1 and #5 in name only. Given that very wealth libertarian elements are leading what is ostensibly a working class coalition. Which I think is a major opportunity for the left in the USA to capitalize on given that right wing policies are likely to make material conditions worse for non partisan voters motivated by kitchen table economics and the current social media landscape.
I initially observed the 4T skeptically but now realize that this is a historical shift in Mexican politics. Will the old political parties be able to recover? PRD is as good as dead. I could certainly see the PRI also disappearing at some point. PAN had a chance to set themselves apart ideologically but then caved into a coalition with PRI and PRD which essentially sent the message that they care little for ideology. Can the new orange MC party appeal to more states than just Nuevo Leon and Jalisco? In the end, these future political parties' only hope is an economic failure by the current government. Like Carville said, "It's the economy, stupid."