"For the CJNG, this is a dream"

A conversation with Chris Dalby about the shifting cartel landscape in Mexico

“In the interview, a visibly exhausted [Ramiro Pozos] González made two predictions. He said that Mencho would lead ‘a war without end’ and that the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG would fight ‘the next war,’ engulfing neighboring states like Michoacán and Zacatecas. Twelve years on, El Molca’s instincts have proven true. The two groups are indeed fighting an unending war, while Michoacán and Zacatecas are consistently among the most violent parts of the country.”

Welcome to The Mexpatriate.

The above quote is from “CJNG: A Quick Guide to Mexico’s Deadliest Cartel” by journalist and organized crime expert Chris Dalby, a densely-packed page-turning history of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel published in 2024.

In today’s edition, I share my recent conversation with Chris about the power shifts caused by the Sinaloa Cartel’s civil war, the impact of increased pressure from the U.S. with the FTO designation and other policies, as well as how Mexican cartels fit into a global context.

An additional 1,200 soldiers and 400 other law enforcement members were deployed to Sinaloa on June 14 to address ongoing violence. (Photo: Omar García Harfuch/X)

Researchers estimated in 2020 that there were up to 150 criminal groups operating in Mexico, but the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel are not just the biggest cartels in the country, they are some of the most powerful in the world. The violent impact of the intra-cartel wars and the “guerra contra el narco” is hard to grapple with: since 2007, the annual number of homicides linked to organized crime in Mexico has not doubled, not tripled—it’s multiplied sixfold.

Chris offers a sobering, clear-eyed perspective—one that dispels paranoid myths about gangs and their members, but simultaneously acknowledges the nearly insurmountable obstacles faced by law enforcement in fighting multi-billion dollar illicit businesses.

Note: This interview transcript has been edited for length and clarity.

What is the biggest shift in the balance of power in Mexico’s cartel landscape so far in 2025?

There have been some surprises, but the general trend confirms what we’ve been seeing in recent years: the Sinaloa Cartel getting closer and closer to implosion. That’s really what we’re witnessing now. And the CJNG has always been in the best position to take advantage of that.

What we’re seeing now with the war between the “Chapitos” (El Chapo’s sons) and the El Mayo’s family is not just another case of fragmentation. Mexico has seen dozens of groups splinter over the years. But we’re talking about the dismantling of what may have been the world’s most significant drug trafficking organization over the last 30 years. That’s now going away. But the drugs they traffic, the weapons, the money—that’s not going away. It’s just going to be redistributed, probably in a more fragmented and violent way. In the short term, I expect more violence.

For the CJNG, this is a dream. The Sinaloa Cartel was always the enemy they couldn’t defeat—too entrenched, too well-armed, too wealthy. Now the Chapitos have actually approached the CJNG for an alliance. That’s a hell of a cap in hand moment, having to ask your deadliest rivals for help.

It’s hard to predict how that alliance will play out, but I think the CJNG is poised to dominate the fentanyl trade. They were already big, but always second to Sinaloa. If they play it right, they could become number one—not just in fentanyl, but across key drug trafficking routes in northern Mexico: Chihuahua, Baja California, Durango. These are areas where they never had a major presence before.

Beyond that, another key trend is we’re seeing far more brazen attacks. Yes, politicians and police commanders have always been targeted, but there’s a new level of comfort with visibility that we hadn’t seen before.

And then there’s the targeting of foreign multinationals—we’re seeing an uptick in cargo hijackings, which is especially concerning ahead of the World Cup. International companies in mining and industry are pulling out of Mexico due to rampant extortion. I can’t think of a tourist area where local hotels aren’t being shaken down.

How do you think the foreign terrorist organization (FTO) designation has impacted cartels so far?

I think the impact on the cartels has been far less than people think. Yes, the FTO designation is significant. And I’m not totally unsympathetic to it. These groups may not be ideological—they’re economic—but you can see the argument that they’re terrorist organizations as far as the damage they cause.

If the designation had been used to open up RICO cases or seize cartel assets more aggressively, that would’ve been a significant step. But it hasn’t played out that way. For the most part, the U.S. has focused on rounding up anyone suspected of cartel ties—often without due process—and deporting them. It plays well in the press, but it actually makes the U.S. less safe. Without proper case-building, it becomes harder to track and understand how organized crime is evolving.

In Mexico, there hasn't been much change either. Yes, the Sheinbaum government “expelled” 29 cartel figures earlier this year, which was significant. But none of them were active leaders—they’d already been in prison, in some cases for decades. That was more a goodwill gesture to the Trump administration than a serious blow to organized crime.

We haven’t seen major arrests like El Mencho, or even close. So, from the cartels' perspective, I think they’re in a holding pattern—waiting to see what new threats emerge. In that sense, the FTO designation has largely been a flop.

What we’re seeing—and this is based on conversations with U.S. law enforcement—is a lack of training and preparation for real case-building. The focus now is on quick seizures, arrests, and deportations. And that’s a problem, because without those cases, we don’t know how cartels are adapting.

Can you explain the differences in how the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG operate?

The Sinaloa Cartel is the last of the legacy cartels. Before them, it was the Guadalajara Cartel. Then you had groups like the Beltrán Leyva Organization and the Tijuana Cartel. These were all centered in northwestern Mexico—old families that owned land and used that for drug production. They grew marijuana and opium poppy, and that agricultural base gave them an early advantage.

In the 1950s–70s, as Mexican labor migrated to the U.S., many came from Sinaloa, Durango, and Michoacán. That created ready-made diaspora communities, which allowed the cartels to build networks for drug distribution abroad. The Sinaloa Cartel typically avoids unnecessary violence—they’ve always been business-first. Of course they’ve committed brutal acts, but violence isn’t their go-to strategy. They prefer a stable status quo where business can thrive.

The CJNG is wired completely differently. And that’s largely because of one man: El Mencho.

El Chapo was always running a federation. He wasn't the sole leader—there were others, like El Mayo and El Azul, who ran their own operations. Yes, they cooperated within a federation. They helped each other. They bought in bulk, and they sold in bulk.

El Mencho takes control of the CJNG after a period of complete upheaval in that group. The CJNG started similarly to the Sinaloa Cartel, with a family called the Valencias, who came from the avocado-growing regions of Michoacán, especially around Aguililla and Uruapan. They were a wealthy, influential family. For decades, they were a major source of employment through their avocado plantations. They owned factories, packaging plants, and other businesses. They even provided loans when banks wouldn’t. They weren't caciques, but they were pillars of the community.

By the mid-20th century, they began growing marijuana—to sell it to would become the ancestors of the Sinaloa Cartel. With the arrival of more ambitious and expansionist family leaders, including one known as Maradona, they began to move into cartel territory. They allied with border cartels, trafficked their marijuana into the U.S., and started moving cocaine for Pablo Escobar. That’s what really elevated them. But eventually, they went to war with the Zetas. And the Valencias were nowhere near ready for that level of violence. You know how the Zetas operated—former paramilitary commandos. They came in guns blazing to Michoacán, launched a short, sharp war, killed dozens of Valencia associates, and drove them into exile.

That loss festered within the leadership. They were forced to go cap in hand to El Chapo, and Mencho doesn’t forget that. So when he breaks free between 2011 and 2013, he’s out to prove a point.

And he doesn’t operate like the Sinaloa Cartel. In fact, he emulates the Zetas far more. He normalizes that ultra-violence we associate with the Zetas, but CJNG has taken it to a whole new level. He moves into Guanajuato to take over oil theft, into Veracruz to secure access to both ports. That legacy of violence continues to this day.

There’s a statistic in the book that’s staggering: between 2013 and 2023, 81% of cartel-related murders were either committed by or involved the CJNG. Eighty-one percent. I couldn’t believe it when I first read it, but then I fact-checked it—it holds. That’s the big difference—the sheer scale of violence.

As for their criminal economies, they're broadly similar to other groups. CJNG has been more opportunistic in exploiting migrants. But overall, the economic structures aren’t dramatically different.

You’ve argued that Trump’s tariff policies could actually end up benefiting organized crime in the region. Could you explain that?

Trump’s tariff policy is hard to pin down. But let’s assume there are prolonged tariffs on Mexico, China, or Canada on most goods. We know cartels are among the world’s most adaptable businesses.

For example, if tariffs are placed on China for fentanyl, as Trump claims, we’ll likely see more of it routed through Mexico. The chemical precursors are already arriving in large quantities—this would just make Mexico a redirection hub.

You’ll also see changes in how drugs cross the border. If cargo trucks face tariffs or delays, cartels may shift to planes, mules among migrants, or American vehicles—which are already widely used.

But that’s not the biggest concern. The real issue is money laundering. Tariffs encourage legal businesses to behave illegally. Trade wars will drive up false invoicing. Who’s good at that? China. And in the Americas? Mexican cartels. They’ve been doing it for years to launder money. They already have the infrastructure and know-how.

Cash movements across the border will increase. Shell companies will boom—CJNG, in particular, is already very good at setting up or acquiring front companies to hide cash flows. This will only incentivize more of that.

Then there’s counterfeiting. Mexico hasn’t had huge issues with it recently, largely because of the maquiladora industry in the north. Most counterfeit goods come from Asia. But if tariffs hit Asian goods, you could see counterfeit and pirated products increasingly move through Mexico. The Mexico–U.S. border is the busiest in the world. If counterfeit demand rises, the cartels will pivot. Adjusting their supply chains takes days, not weeks.

There’s already been an uptick in hijackings of trucks out of Manzanillo and Lázaro Cárdenas. More extortion of mining companies, hotels, even offshore platforms. And it’s not just “pay us this amount.” In interviews I’ve done, local executives were surprised by how much cartels knew about their operations. When a cartel bribes a local government, they often demand access to industrial databases. They know how many avocado trees each farmer owns, what a gold mine extracts weekly. They know the trucks, the quantities, the values—everything.

And then there’s the migration market. Tariffs increase pressure on the poorest communities—Mexico, Central America, South America, the Caribbean. That forces more people to migrate. Even if Trump’s policies are currently reducing migration numbers through deportation and deterrence, long term, increased poverty and closed legal migration routes will push more people into the arms of trafficking networks.

So, there are four areas—fentanyl flows, trafficking route shifts, money laundering, and migration—that are all likely to benefit cartels under prolonged tariffs. Sure, this is speculative. But I think it’s fairly probable.

The proposed remittance tax could also drive people toward illicit methods of moving money, right?

Exactly. The proposed bill is a 3.5% tax on remittances sent from the U.S. by non-citizens. What’s that going to do? There are plenty of U.S. citizens who can send that money legally, so that opens the door for fronting and laundering. The whole system just gets pushed further underground. I don’t think you’re going to stop remittances—you’re just going to see them shift.

I understand the idea behind that law, but the workarounds are so easy.

How do you think the FTO designation could affect businesses operating in Mexico?

I think there’s definitely a risk there. I haven’t seen any examples of that yet—though maybe I missed them. In fact, there’s some sloppy work on the U.S. side, because the terrorist designation opens up the use of the RICO Act to go after these groups. But you have to build the case very carefully. You need a pattern of racketeering: extortion, fraud, bribery, corruption, gambling, prostitution, drug trafficking, money laundering—things that help build the network. And you need to show a business structure.

And if they’re legitimate businesses, that’s where it gets complicated. The U.S. would then have to decide: are we going to prosecute them as part of a terrorist network, or give them a way out because that’s just the reality of doing business? There’s no real precedent for this yet.

Another thing the FTO designation allows is defining a terrorist enterprise, but that means proving hierarchy, command and control structures, financial flows, business operations, communication channels—all of which force you to investigate businesses in Mexico. And that depends on Mexico cooperating.

But after everything Trump has lobbed at Mexico, do you really think they’re in the mood to cooperate? I don’t. Sheinbaum is not López Obrador—she’s more sympathetic, she speaks English, she’s lived in the U.S.—but she’s no wallflower, she’ll stand up for herself. This hostile U.S. attitude undermines every effort at cooperation down the line.

What about using the FTO designation to go after weapons trafficking from the U.S. into Mexico?

There have been a few attempts. Ioan Grillo is really the expert on this topic, but in February, I think it was Dick Durbin and another senator who proposed the Stop Arming Cartels Act. It was aimed at banning the import, sale, manufacture, transfer, and possession of .50-caliber rifles. It’s been stuck in committee for five months. And all the co-sponsors were Democrats. Is that going anywhere in a Republican-controlled Congress? No. Anything related to gun control is just too politically loaded—pun intended.

There’s just no appetite in the U.S. for this fight.

Even when there is, how do you stop it? They’re cracking down on ghost guns—ghost guns are thriving. They’re cracking down on straw purchases—those are thriving too. There are just too many cars, too many people, too many gun shops. I’m very pessimistic about seeing any real improvement there.

The Supreme Court ruling against Mexico’s gun lawsuit was unanimous. There’s just no precedent in U.S. law for this. For them, it’s lawful commerce being used unlawfully in Mexico. It’s not the manufacturers’ fault. So if the manufacturers aren’t going to crack down, and the government isn’t either, and there’s no real way to control the sales.

It’s really about the money, tackling these illicit markets. But that requires multi-year investigations. This is still overwhelmingly a cash business. Trade-based money laundering, small mom-and-pop shops at the border—that’s how the money is really moving. Crypto is there, but more for paying foreign partners than financing the cartels. El Mencho doesn’t want Bitcoin. He wants dollars.

How do you see Mexico’s cartels in the context of global organized crime?

There was an article last week that made me literally hop out of my chair. A drug lab was busted in Marseille, France, and the headline read: “Sinaloa Cartel Lab Seized in France.”

Without even reading it, I knew—no, that is not a Sinaloa Cartel lab!

There’s so much hysteria—“Sinaloa Cartel is killing your kids,” “CJNG is hiding fentanyl in your kids’ Halloween candy.” No. They are the wholesalers. They manufacture, process, and ship drugs—mostly to the U.S., but increasingly to Europe and Australia.

The Sinaloa Cartel doesn’t have street corners in the U.S. They don’t have stash houses where local dealers pick up their daily supply. That’s not how they operate.

They have partners all over the world: motorcycle gangs in Chile, triads in China, the DZ Mafia in France, the Mocro Mafia in the Netherlands, and many others in South America. Their job is to get the drugs into the hands of those groups, who then process and distribute them.

Fentanyl may be down slightly in the U.S. right now, but I don’t think that’s because the cartels are making less. I think it’s a shift in U.S. consumption patterns. Meanwhile, we’re seeing more synthetic drugs from Mexico turning up in Europe—which I was skeptical of for a long time, but now it’s clearly happening.

So, the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG remain international powerhouses when it comes to drugs, but they operate at the wholesale level. They’re connectors, not the ones in your community slinging drugs to kids outside of school.

What’s more concerning to me is this second tier of cartels in Mexico. Groups like the Northeast Cartel, remnants of the Gulf Cartel, and the Ardillos in Guerrero—who I actually think are the scariest group in Mexico right now. These second-level groups are controlling territory in a way we haven’t really seen before.

In places like Mexico City or Chilpancingo, you’re now seeing bodies dropped over a few months for control of places like the Central de Abastos in Mexico City, or the municipal market in Chilpancingo. It’s the downstream effect of what I mentioned earlier: if multinationals are feeling the weight of extortion, imagine what that means for everyday shops. That’s always been true in some parts of Mexico, but it’s much more widespread now.

We’re seeing more sophistication among lower-level gangs. Take the Ardillos, for example. If you go back five or six years, they were up in the mountains of Guerrero, mostly involved in heroin and some cocaine trafficking through Acapulco. But they were “transportistas”—they moved drugs north and passed them to other groups.

After COVID, they came down from the mountains. Heroin was basically dead as a cash crop—fentanyl killed Mexican heroin and opium poppy. So they lost a major income stream and came down to Chilpancingo. And the speed with which they set up shop was impressive.

We’ve got photos of them dining with the mayor of Chilpancingo. When two of their members were arrested, they brought in people from loyal mountain communities and literally hijacked an armored personnel carrier and crashed it through the gates of the Guerrero State Parliament. The way they operate—it’s almost CJNG-like. It’s extremely violent. What worries me most is that the government doesn’t seem concerned.

When Sheinbaum released her security plan at the beginning of her term, these groups weren’t even mentioned. No mention of the second-level cartels. That lack of tailored strategy tells me these smaller groups are going to keep growing.

Another area that’s flared up in recent years is Chiapas. Who are the main players there?

Yes, Chiapas is a key area—it’s a battleground between Sinaloa and CJNG, each using local groups as proxies.

The big question is whether the Los Chapitos-CJNG alliance in the northwest is nationwide and lasting—or just a temporary marriage of convenience. One way to assess this would be to look at violence in Chiapas. And right now, violence is down there. Not dramatically, but compared to summer 2023–2024, it’s noticeably better.

You’ve always had cross-border economies in Chiapas—migrants stashing drugs on the Guatemala side to evade Mexican police. That goes back to the El Chapo era. But then CJNG muscled in to try and take control and “leveled up” local gangs within indigenous communities—I hesitate to use the term “indigenous gangs” because it can be exaggerated.

If Sinaloa and CJNG pull back or stop fighting, that knowledge base and infrastructure remain. Everyone now knows how lucrative it is to extort migrants—especially in Chiapas. Tapachula is extortion central; even immigration officials are in on it.

If the Sinaloa–CJNG alliance falls apart, Chiapas will be one of the first places to explode again. On the other hand, if peace holds, we might see continued decline in violence.

What about incursions by other regional gangs into Mexico?

Back when I was with InSight Crime, we reported on MS-13 in Mexico. They were definitely present—safe houses, smuggling routes for members fleeing Guatemala or El Salvador, often following migrant caravans. But it was low-key.

Tren de Aragua is similar. They have a specific expansion model. What frustrates me is how clueless some officials in Mexico and the U.S. are about it. From Venezuela to Colombia, Colombia to Peru, Peru to Chile, Venezuela to Brazil—they follow a consistent blueprint. But officials don’t seem to understand it, let alone apply it domestically.

In Mexico, their presence is minimal. Mostly they’re shadowing migrant flows and preying on them. We’ve seen some cases in Mexico City—a prostitution ring, a sex trafficking ring—reportedly run by Venezuelans tied to Tren de Aragua. That fits their model: follow migrants, put them in debt, and build a criminal structure around them wherever they settle—whether it’s Mexico City, Lima, Bogotá, or New York.

Some officials in Mexico completely overreacted. Chihuahua even created an anti-Tren de Aragua police task force. I giggled. I mean, on what grounds do you think you have enough to justify that? Or is it just for optics?

In the U.S., there is a Tren de Aragua presence, but it’s probably much smaller than anyone thinks. The vast majority of people labeled as Tren de Aragua aren’t actually part of it. Authorities are using tattoos to identify them—when Tren de Aragua doesn’t use tattoos. They have other ways to communicate—WhatsApp, for instance—ways to recruit, and ways to expand their criminal network across countries. But tattoos? No. It’s just not true. And anyone who says it is, is either lying or misinformed.

In the U.S., because authorities are just arresting and deporting people, no cases are being built, there’s no evidence about what they’re actually doing. That creates a worrying black hole.

As of now, there are only two real cases in the U.S. that I know of—one in New York, one in Tennessee. I’m not saying there aren’t more, but there’s no evidence in the indictments. There’s no rationale given. It just stops at “Venezuelans got arrested.”

You also cover organized crime in sports. What do you see as the major security challenges coming up with the 2026 World Cup?

First, there’s always been criminal infiltration in football. Take CJNG and Chivas, for example—there have been serious allegations of CJNG connections with Chivas Guadalajara. There's also control of the “barras bravas”—the hooligans—who are used to extort and make money around stadiums.

But something that stood out to investigators is that, for a long time, match-fixing in Mexico was almost nonexistent—or at least undetectable. That was surprising. Brazil is terrible for match-fixing. Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Argentina—they all have issues. But Mexico? Crickets. You track this through betting odds—sudden surges or suspicious patterns.

That’s changing now. In just the last 8 or 9 months, we've started seeing match-fixing alerts every day in Mexico. It’s popping up in the second and third divisions, even women’s football. There was a big scandal in Mazatlán earlier this year involving a women’s match being fixed. So that’s worrying.

The other thing is the influx of businesses setting up in Mexico because of the World Cup—that’s like Christmas for the cartels. I’m not saying they’ll kidnap the CEO of a big World Cup sponsor, but all the small opportunities add up: extorting more trucks on the roads, shaking down vendors, corrupt police getting in on the protection racket, even controlling parking spaces.

I don’t think they’ll be able to fix a World Cup match—there’s too much oversight—but everything around the tournament creates opportunities for criminal activity.

And I haven’t seen any serious effort from the Mexican Federation—or FIFA—to acknowledge that. That’s one of the biggest frustrations in covering sports: FIFA and the federations always want to say, “Sport is wonderful. Sport unites people.” Don’t worry about the dead workers in Qatar. Don’t worry about the political prisoners in Beijing. Just enjoy the football. Messi! Ronaldo! Goals! Flags! Celebration!

But if you really love football, you also have to deal with its dirty side. And I think Mexico’s role in the 2026 World Cup will be eye-opening in terms of criminal access. Again, it’s not about one specific tactic—it’s that sports become another tool in the criminal toolbox.

How do you do such detailed investigative work while based outside of Mexico?

I travel extensively in Mexico, and I’ve also been in the U.S. a lot this year, especially because of research for the Tren de Aragua book. I work with a large network of researchers and rely on local fixers for fieldwork.

In terms of the books we write—they’re not really meant to be investigative exposés. But everyone’s so focused on the current news cycle that they’re forgetting 30 years of history. And the lessons learned from law enforcement over those decades still shape how these groups operate today.

I often say that the fastest-moving force in the universe isn’t light or gravity, it’s criminality. And there’s this mental switch: before kids enter a gang, they’re innocent and in need of protection. But the moment they pick up a gun or sell a dose of fentanyl or work as a coyote, suddenly they’re labeled as hardened gangsters who deserve to die. You see that mindset in both Mexican and U.S. law enforcement. And that worries me.

Of course there are true sociopaths in the cartels who revel in violence. But I’ll never forget what one of the highest-ranking Gulf Cartel members told me. He said, “I got into this to buy my mom a house. She was 55 and had never owned one. This was the fastest way to make that happen.”

He proudly said, “I got caught, but my mom has a house.”

I’m not defending what he did—but if we want to understand how and why people enter this world, we have to look at motivations too. Just killing people won’t fix it.

Look at El Salvador, where everyone’s raving about Bukele and the mano dura approach—yes, I’m not denying that he’s pacified the country and made it much safer—but at what cost? He hasn’t addressed the socio-economic poverty that created the gangs in the first place. At some point, that debt comes back.

Which is something Claudia and AMLO have at least paid lip service to—addressing the root causes.

It is. And I think there was some naivety on the part of López Obrador. I think the “hugs not bullets” thing was just a phrase he repeated a few times, not an actual policy. He did do good work on unemployment and raising the minimum wage, and those things do dissuade people from criminal activity. They give people an economic alternative—and that’s key.

What’s going to reduce organized crime is going after the money and giving potential cartel recruits an economic alternative. When you don’t do that, you increase illegal migration and violent crime. It’s textbook logic.

Is there anything that makes you optimistic about violence decreasing in Mexico in the coming years?

Honestly? No.

If we go back to the question about FTO designations, the victims of U.S. policy are Mexicans, Venezuelans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans—the same people who, 90% of the time, are also victims of the cartels. They flee their countries because of cartel violence, and then they’re blamed for being cartel members and sent back. I’m not saying the U.S. should open its doors to everyone—that’s not realistic—but this cycle of “detain, beat up, deport” doesn’t solve the problem. It just gets you re-elected for looking tough on crime.

There are positive trends—but they’re in the United States. Violent crime has gone down consistently there. Yes, cartels are selling drugs and contributing to overdose deaths, but they’re not killing a thousand Americans or bribing entire police forces. I get this pushback all the time—people saying, “cartels have been corrupting U.S. cops for years.” Sure, they might bribe a local sheriff or a border agent, but it’s not systemic. You don’t see entire departments corrupted or disbanded because of fear of cartel retaliation.

When Sheinbaum took office, I was hopeful about her security chief, Omar García Harfuch. He’s a prosecutor, he’s targeted cartels’ assets and personnel, and was involved in the capture of Menchito and nearly captured El Mencho in 2015—which is why they tried to kill him in Mexico City a few years ago.

But so far, I haven’t been blown away. In April, he announced the creation of this elite force to fight cartels, but I haven’t seen much from them since. The dismantling of the Federal Police is still being felt: a loss of expertise, of public trust—however limited that trust was—and now the National Guard is essentially a glorified border force. So no, in Mexico I haven’t seen any meaningful change.

Even if they captured El Mencho and all the Chapitos tomorrow—great, they deserve prison—but it wouldn’t change anything.

And that’s the vicious circle. Even the discovery of that ranch in Teuchitlán, Jalisco—the so-called “death camp”—didn’t change anything. They’ve already found another one in Colima. That’s the new headline now. There’s an expectation of horror and an expectation of impunity. What a jolly way to end!

Thank you for reading and feel free to send me your comments and questions at hola@themexpatriate.com. If you enjoyed this interview, take a moment to check out Seasons of Crime and Chris’s new book about Tren de Aragua, just released last month. And if you want to support my work, please consider a paid subscription to The Mexpatriate.